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DOI 10.1016/j.stem.2009.09.007The ability and desire to sort out and cate-
gorize life around andwithin us is a central
aspect of the human experience. Modern
developmental biology is no exception,
and three recent papers provide a new
impetus for us to rethink theways in which
science and society go about drawing
boundaries in and around life and its
developmental potential. Three indepen-
dent groups just succeeded in the gener-
ation of mice derived entirely from
induced pluripotent stem cells (iPSCs)
through the most stringent test of pluripo-
tency, tetraploid embryo complementa-
tion (Boland et al., 2009; Kang et al.,
2009; Zhao et al., 2009). This achievement
stands as the final proof that iPSCs and
embryonic stem cells (ESCs), when sub-
jected to the same developmental chal-
lenge, can be functionally equivalent.
It is likely that these results will be
read by some as yet another blow to
the potentiality argument that claims
that human embryos matter morally
because they have the potential to
become people. Positions that defend
the moral status of human embryos as
individuals per se are unlikely to be
swayed by this latest research develop-
ment, but the potentiality argument has
in fact been vulnerable to the twists of
research progress for some time. The
birth of Dolly (Wilmut et al., 1997) and
the success of mouse ESCs in tetraploid
complementation were taken up in the
bioethical discourse to refute the attribu-
tion of moral worth on the basis of devel-
opmental competence (Harris, 1997).
With the demonstration that the reprog-
ramming process can confer to any
single cell the potential to give rise,
under the correct circumstances, to an
entire living being, some may argue
that the potentiality argument has finally
been put to rest.
In contrast, I would like to propose that
rather than impacting thepotentialityargu-
ment, the new results prompt a critical358 Cell Stem Cell 5, October 2, 2009 ª2009reevaluation of the relationship between
scientific knowledge and public delibera-
tion. This scientific achievement under-
scores the intellectual thrust of today’s
biology and its underlying epistemology
that ties the understanding of living
processes to the task of redesigning and
harnessing them for applied purposes.
Yamanaka’s pioneering efforts, in con-
trast to the almost alchemic features of
nuclear transfer, have turned epigenetic
reprogramming into a relatively straight-
forward process accessible to laborato-
ries worldwide (Takahashi and Yama-
naka, 2006) and, in doing so, have
reinforced our understanding of develop-
mental fates as grid-like maps of molec-
ular switches. As noted by Paul Rabinow,
the essence of modern science is that
‘‘the object to be known [.] will be
know in such a way that it can be
changed. [.] knowledge and power,
understanding and reform, are built in,
from the start, as simultaneous goals
and means’’ (Rabinow, 1996). He was
referring to the human genome, read
through the same technological frame-
work that would enable its rewriting. But
this conflation between knowledge and
intervention appears all the more true for
molecular developmental biology. We
study developmental trajectories by
changing them, by interfering with them
in model systems, and in so doing we
acquire the power to redesign them. By
illustrating this theme so dramatically,
the recent iPSC experiments invite us to
reconsider the relationship between
science’s understandings of life and our
societal views of how to regard them.
Thus, the point is not that one can no
longer use the potentiality argument
because fibroblasts might now be consid-
ered as potential persons in a more
concrete way than ever before. Rather,
the point is that once science exposes so
clearly that developmental potential is
a question of molecular context amenableElsevier Inc.to our intervention, speaking of ‘‘poten-
tial’’ and ‘‘boundaries of potential,’’
though still possible, becomes an exer-
cise of political freedom and account-
ability. That is, there is no longer, if there
ever was, any ready-made grid of bound-
aries that biology can let us see as if
they were simply out there and that can
serve as neutral justification for political
choices. Rather, there is a whole range of
developmental possibilitie, a collection of
fates that are at once subjects for the
pursuit of knowledge and candidates for
intervention.
So now that we have achieved the
grail of turning a fibroblast into a mouse,
what will we do with it? It will be no
longer possible, if it ever was, to build
a sound bioethical argument, on either
side, by simply appealing to a biological
given: ‘‘we ought to behave like this,
because this cell is able to .’’ When
any cell can become an animal by
applying a known and established
experimental protocol, science may offer
invaluable expertise, but it is ultimately
the polity that is called in to deliberate
on what to do with our reprogramming
powers.
But how to go about this task, and what
role should scientists play? Endorsing and
implementing the shift fromapublic under-
standing of science to a public engage-
ment with science is a clear priority.
Although the dissemination of knowledge
remains a crucial aim, it is clear that,
precisely because guidance needs to be
found and negotiated among the values
of our societies, even a hypothetical
‘‘complete’’ biological knowledge on the
side of the public would still not solve the
question of what to do with it. As progress
in research,exemplifiedby the iPSCwater-
shed, invests us with new options over our
bodies’ regenerative and generative capa-
bilities, engaging in a discussion as to its
ends and means will be challenged by the
wide-ranging value systems that exist in
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Lettera diverse society. Several attempts have
been made, often under the heading of
deliberative democracy, to foster new
institutions and processes in which citi-
zens can truly participate in shaping
science governance. These are no easy
exercises, but scientists should take them
seriously and contribute to their further
development, entering the public sphere
as citizens who participate in the formula-
tion of society’s moral commitments andthe political task of drawing boundaries
around life and our options on it.
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